

Attack #3

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G.H./No.54

March 22, 1950.

Although neither the terms of the Sino-Soviet Treaty, as far as they have been made public, nor the recognition of Ho Chi Minh by the Yugoslav Government supply conclusive additional aspects for supplementing my memorandum of 8 February 1950, the following observations on both subjects may be allowed.

1. As regards the Sino-Soviet Treaty, the long duration of the Moscow negotiations between the Soviet Government and the leaders of Communist China proves that Mao Tse Tung was fully aware of the dangers involved for China in Stalin's design to preserve for the Soviet Union the advantages of the treaty she concluded with the Chinese Nationalist Government on August 14, 1945. It can be further assumed as certain that Mao Tse Tung, led by the innate Chinese distrust and deep-rooted conviction of Chinese mental and cultural superiority to the Russians, offered a stubborn resistance to Soviet demands endangering China's sovereign rights and independence. There is also no doubt, that Mao Tse Tung's attitude has been decisively influenced

by

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by his appraisal of both the fate of the Soviet satellite states and Tito's successful resistance to Moscow's ambitions for domination.

On the other hand, it seems that in the course of the negotiations Stalin himself became conscious of the limitations of his omnipotence and, therefore, decided not to overstrain the bow. The fact that the Sino-Soviet Treaty appears rather as an act of Soviet contraction than of expansion indicates that the Soviet Government exercised restraint toward China in order to keep its hands and back free in case decisive events should occur in Europe.

From the above-mentioned facts the conclusion may be drawn that the ideas underlying the Tito movement will fall on fertile ground in China. However, the corresponding propaganda must be spread by people who, by virtue of close and consistent observation of the development of Russo-Chinese relations, are able to bring every evidence of a violation of the treaty by the Soviet Government to the knowledge of the Chinese people in a form appealing to the Chinese mentality. In particular, this propaganda should be principally

devoted

devoted to describing the enslavement of the peasants in the satellite states of the Soviet Union by the system of collectivization and to stressing the relative independence enjoyed in this respect by the Yugoslav peasantry. For revelations of this kind the Chinese peasant is very susceptible because of his innate desire for personal ownership.

2. The confusion that occurred in connection with Ho Chi Minh's bid to Tito for recognition is rather revealing. There is reason to believe that Ho Chi Minh's step was neither a slip nor an error but a subtle Oriental maneuver undertaken by Ho Chi Minh with full cognizance of Mao Tse Tung and designed as a hint to Stalin that they both are not willing to submit themselves entirely to his regimentation.

Tito's ideas are contagious and it may be expected that the desire to follow his example will flame up in all parts of the world dominated by Moscow, particularly in the Far East. Therefore, by fostering these inclinations the Kremlin's position can be decisively weakened.